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A B S T R A C T
In comparison with other regional host countries Lebanon's response to the Syrian refugee crisis is characterized
by a remarkable degree of institutional ambiguity. Government policy has centered on the prohibition of formal
refugee camps and adopted regulations with regard to registration, residence, and work which drive refugees
into illegality. This is partly the result of the chaotic and overwhelming nature of any refugee crisis, which is only
reinforced by the Lebanese government's limited resources and capacities and the country's dysfunctional po-
litical system. However, institutional ambiguity in the context of the Lebanese response to the Syrian refugee
crisis is not merely contingent. Departing from agnotology theory, this article demonstrates that there is also a
strategic component to the institutional ambiguity that now determines the life of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
On the basis of fieldwork among Syrian refugee communities, elaborate policy analysis, and an extensive lit-
erature review the article reveals the political utility of maintaining uncertainty and precariousness. These in-
sights have profound implications for the analysis of refugee politics and the formulation of policy re-
commendations.
1. Introduction
The conflict that has engulfed Syria since 2011 has internally
displaced 6.5 million people and forced another 5 million to flee
abroad, overwhelmingly to neighboring countries. In this article, we
explore how Lebanon has dealt with the ongoing influx of refugees.
Before the outbreak of war in Syria, Lebanon counted an estimated
four million inhabitants. It currently hosts approximately 1.5 million
refugees. This makes it the country with the highest number of re-
fugees per capita in the world. Lebanon, as such, represents an em-
pirically important case to understand the dynamics of the Syrian
refugee crisis. The specific way in which the Lebanese government has
responded to Syrians seeking refuge, which revolves around a form of
officially condoned and even enforced informality, moreover, holds
particular conceptual relevance for the broader analysis of the gov-
ernance of refugees.
In comparison with other regional host countries, the Lebanese re-
sponse to the Syrian refugee crisis is characterized by informality – or
rather, as we will explain in the following section, institutional ambi-
guity: an unpredictable, hybrid form of governance that emerges at the
continuously shifting interface between formal and informal forms of
regulation. Government policy has centered on the prohibition of
formal refugee camps and adopted regulations with regard to regis-
tration, residence, and work drive refugees into informality and even
illegality. The aim of this article is to explore the causes, characteristics,
and consequences of the ensuing institutional ambiguity. We ac-
knowledge that institutional ambiguity is partly the inevitable result of
the chaotic and overwhelming nature of any refugee crisis. Paralysis
and confusion are, moreover, only reinforced by the Lebanese govern-
ment's limited resources and capacities, which are in turn partly the
result of the country's dysfunctional sectarian system. We argue, how-
ever, that this is only part of the explanation. Institutional ambiguity in
the context of Lebanon's response to the Syrian refugee crisis, our article
suggests, is not merely contingent. Our analysis illustrates that there is
also a strategic component to the institutional ambiguity that now de-
termines the life of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This demands attention
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for the political utility of maintaining such uncertainty and pre-
cariousness.
In addressing the spatial and institutional dimensions of the policies
and politics that govern Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the article con-
tributes to two meta-debates that have been central to modern political
geography: the politics of migration (Kuusisto-Arponen & Gilmartin,
2015) and the question of ‘campness’ (Katz, 2015; Martin, 2015; Minca,
2015). Our rethinking of the uncertainty, precariousness, and un-
predictability that refugees are routinely subjected to as a specific form
of governance extends emerging thinking on the centrality of un-
certainty to the refugee experience (Horst & Grabska, 2015) and helps
to revisit discussions on policing mobility (Isleyen, 2018) and on the
‘voluntariness’ of refugee return that are central to critical border stu-
dies. While research on the political geography of migration has in-
creasingly shifted from focusing on national mandates to investigating
the supranational scope of refugee governance (Kuusisto-Arponen &
Gilmartin, 2015), we believe that our in-depth exploration of Lebanon's
refugee response reinvigorates current understandings of such supra-
national migration politics. Our national-level analysis of Lebanon's
institutional ambiguity as a strategy to enforce return resonates closely
with, for instance, recent work on the politics of violent abandonment
and political neglect and inertia vis-à-vis refugees in Europe as dis-
cussed by Davies and Isakjee (2015) and Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi
(2017). This establishes the ‘transmutation over space’ of specific
modes of refugee governance and their ever more punitive nature
(Davies & Isakjee, 2015, p. 94).
In studying the drivers and impacts of Lebanon's ‘no-camp-policy’
and the resultant proliferation of informal refugee settlements as part of
a more encompassing production of institutional ambiguity, our article
also engages with scholarly work on refugee camps, informal settle-
ments, and ‘campscapes’ (Martin, 2015; see also; Katz, 2015). Exploring
the logics of informal Syrian refugee settlements in Lebanon opens up
analytical space to consider the utility of ‘non-camps’ or ‘counter-
camps’ (Minca, 2015). Camps are routinely analyzed as instruments of
biopolitical control and surveillance. We propose that the hybrid spaces
constituted by informal settlements that are neither citizen territory nor
refugee camp have their own political expediency. By considering the
spatial politics of informal refugee settlements as part of a larger gov-
ernmentality revolving around institutional ambiguity, we build on
Martin’s (2015, p.14) conceptualization of refugee spaces as being ruled
by potentiality rather than sovereignty. Particularly, we further Oesch’s
(2017) understanding of refugee spaces and mobilities as determined by
‘multiple ambiguities,’ the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of
particular spaces and populations from formal governance modes. This,
in turn, sheds new light on refugee evictions. Our analysis suggests that
the continuous displacement that is enabled by a ‘state of exception’ is
not necessarily a manifestation of ‘political power outside the control of
the Lebanese state,’ as Ramadan (2009, p.153) suggests, but can be a
form of state power in its own right.
This conclusion is based on fieldwork data, analysis of policy
documents, and a literature review. Our methodology engages with
both national policy-making dynamics, through document analysis and
expert interviews, and local implementation and negotiation logics, by
means of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and observa-
tions. The analysis of policy documents presented us with a paradox as
the very institutional ambiguity that constituted our central research
interest per definition meant that significant aspects of the governance
of Syrian refugees in Lebanon were not captured in official policy. It is
to a large extent the absence of a comprehensive formal policy that we
seek to understand. Nevertheless, the relevant laws, agreements and
political decisions – such as for instance the government's neutrality, or
‘dissociation,’ policy as communicated through the 2012 ‘Baabda
Declaration;’ the 2014 ‘Policy Paper on Syrian Refugee Displacement;’
and the 2015 ‘Lebanon Crisis Response Plan’ (LCRP) – are part of our
analysis.
Empirical findings on the Syrian refugee crisis were collected by
Jessy Nassar over the course of three years in the context of three dif-
ferent research projects.2 In total, 101 semi-structured interviews were
conducted with various stakeholders ranging from government offi-
cials, municipality representatives, makhatir,3 and international and
local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to Syrian and Lebanese
communities from various backgrounds. In addition, extensive ethno-
graphic field notes were developed and five focus group discussions
were conducted with Syrian and Lebanese communities.
The paper draws on fieldwork conducted in Qob Elias, Bar Elias, and
Bebnine, in addition to interviews conducted with NGO representatives
and government officials in Beirut. Both located in the Zahle district of
Bekaa region, Qob Elias and Bar Elias host the largest concentrations of
Syrian refugees in the Bekaa. In these localities, refugees outnumber the
local population. All three settings are classified among the country's
most vulnerable localities in Lebanon.4 Interviews conducted with
municipal authorities in Bar Elias indicated that the municipality was
affected by the refugee influx to such an extent that it caused severe
tensions between local community members and the municipality.5 Yet,
Bar Elias has received more attention from local and international
NGOs than the other localities and various infrastructural and devel-
opmental projects that benefitted both the refugee and host commu-
nities were implemented there since 2011.6 In Qob Elias, the natur-
alization of a large number of Syrians in 1994 resulted in the
establishment of good connections between the Syrian community and
key political parties in the region. This partly contributed to the in-
tegration of post-2011 Syrian refugees within the local community.
Such relations help facilitate refugees' access to various forms of ser-
vices through the usage of informal networks – even if Syrians living in
refugee settlements benefit from this significantly less than self-settled
Syrians living outside the settlements. The refugee influx has also sig-
nificantly affected Bebnine, which is ‘one of the poorest in the northern
Akkar region’ and has the ‘highest overall poverty rate in Lebanon, at
more than two times the national average and six times that of the
capital Beirut’ (Christophersen, Thorleifsson and Tiltnes, 2013,
pp.12–13). Bebnine is thus much poorer than the two other localities.
Also, in contrast to the other two localities, Bebnine's governance
structures rely on familial and kinship ties rather than political alle-
giances.
The data underlying our analysis were not specifically sampled to
capture our central phenomenon of institutional ambiguity in Lebanon's
governance of refugees. Rather, the significance of such in-
stitutionalized uncertainty emerged from these combined datasets that
deal with a variation of localities in a more inductive fashion. In other
words: We did not set out looking for ambiguity, but ambiguity pre-
sented itself as a defining feature of the politics and policies aiming to
govern refugee life in the various research projects on which we em-
pirically draw here. It is from this vantage point that we then explored
and reconsidered the empirical data collected by Jessy from an
2 The first part of the fieldwork was done as a thesis project between June and
August 2014 and examined how the refugee crisis was resourceful in re-
producing statist images of sovereignty. The second major set of findings was
collected between December 2014 and March 2016 under the auspices of the
Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS). Another part of this paper's findings
is based on fieldwork, observations, and analysis conducted as a researcher for
the American University of Beirut on a project in partnership with the London
School of Economics between March 2015 and August 2016. Part of the data
collected and analyses generated by the Jessy Nassar during this project was
published by Sanyal (2017).
3 A mukhtar is a state representative that performs social and administrative
services on the neighborhood or village level (Stel, 2015b).
4 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/27032015_
VulnerabilityMapMarch2015.pdf.
5 Interviews by Jessy Nassar with previous mayor and municipal support
assistant– Bar Elias, 7 April 2015; 1 April 2015.
6 Interview by Jessy Nassar – Bar Elias, 14 April 2016.
J. Nassar, N. Stel Political Geography 70 (2019) 44–54
45
agnotological perspective to arrive at the insights presented in this
paper. This also means that the empirical examples that we draw on do
not follow a comparative format, but reflect the unique ambiguities
manifest in each case.
The article continues with a discussion of agnotology – the study of
socially created and politically imposed ‘not-knowing’ of which we
consider strategic ambiguity a specific manifestation – that constitutes
our main conceptual lens. We then introduce Lebanon's response to the
Syrian refugee crisis, discussing the characteristics of the initial ‘no-
policy-policy’ and the subsequent ‘formal informality’ as well as their
consequences. After this, we draw on fieldwork among Syrian refugee
communities, elaborate policy analysis, and extensive literature review
to explore the causes of the institutional ambiguity we identified. We
demonstrate that institutional ambiguity is at times adopted by
Lebanese authorities as a strategic mode of governance towards refugee
spaces and populations. The article concludes with a reflection on
conceptual as well as political implications.
2. Agnotology and strategic institutional ambiguity
The Lebanese approach to accommodating the large number of
Syrian refugees that have fled to the country is often described as
characterized by informality. The adjective ‘informality’ refers to
practices or actors that are not endorsed or sanctioned by any official
public organization (Sindzingre, 2004, p. 5). Informal institutions or
informal governance, then, refer to ways of organizing public life (here
understood as collective decision-making on public goods provision)
that are outside the officially codified and regulated system recognized
by a government (Anderson & Francois, 2008; Bayat, 1997; Helmke &
Levitsky, 2004; Roy, 2005). Housing in the formal sector, for instance,
is registered by the relevant government department and subjected to a
system of rules and regulations that determine who can live where for
how long. Informal forms of settlement fall outside this system (Roy,
2005, p. 148; Stel, 2016). This does not mean that there are no rules
guiding the allocation and stay of residents in informal settlements. It
merely means that these rules are mostly not written down and that
they are not upheld by the state but by other social or public authorities
(Yassin, Stel, & Rassi, 2016).
Most practices and institutions that make up daily life, however, are
neither fully formal, nor completely informal; they often fall partly
under formal policy, with other aspects being informally regulated. In
reality, then, people's situations are often characterized by what we call
‘institutional ambiguity’ (Ho, 2001; Stel, 2016). This term refers to the
uncertain and shifting nature of the combination of formal and informal
rules that people face on any given aspect of life, particularly in areas
where a state lacks the capacity or will to govern. Institutional ambi-
guity, then, often reflects instances of not-knowing and not-acting on
the side of formal authorities, as informal activities or actors remain
under their radar. While people themselves often keenly understand
and navigate both formal and informal governance systems (Bayat,
1997; Roy, 2005), they have few incentives to share these under-
standings as it is most likely not in their interest to appear on the radar
by revealing their coping mechanisms (Stel, 2016). This combination of
authorities' partial ignorance and people's covertness makes the phe-
nomenon of institutionally ambiguous governance complicated to study
empirically.
To deal with this challenge we turn to the notion of agnotology, an
innovative and interdisciplinary approach to the politics of knowledge.
Agnotology studies ‘agnogenesis,’ the process of generating or main-
taining ignorance (Christensen, 2008). ‘Ignorance,’ here, is broadly
understood. It encompasses not-knowing as well as partial, unstable, or
uncertain forms of knowledge and resonates with work on risk, doubt,
and unpredictability (McGoey, 2012a/b). Agnotology is broadly con-
cerned with what people do not know or claim not to know and how
such not-knowing manifests itself (Smithson, 2008). It thus aims to
‘explore how ignorance is produced or maintained in diverse settings,
through mechanisms such as deliberate or inadvertent neglect, secrecy,
and suppression, document destruction, unquestioned tradition, and
myriad forms of inherent (or avoidable) culturopolitical selectivity’
(Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008, p.vii). As a heuristic device, agnotology
reveals gaps, silences, contradictions, inconsistencies, taboos, and sen-
sitivities in people's behavior and discourse. Agnotology asks questions
like: Who knows about this issue and who does not?; How did people
come to know this?; and Why do others not know about this? These
questions have unequivocal spatial dimensions (Stel, 2016). As Proctor
(1995, p.8) notes, the distribution of uncertainty and ambiguity is never
even and agnotology has a ‘distinct and changing political geography’
that helps us to empirically pinpoint instances of institutional ambi-
guity.
But agnotology does not merely allow us to describe manifestations
of institutional ambiguity, it can also help to explain why it exists and
endures. Agnotology is unequivocally constructivist and sees un-
certainty, doubt, and ignorance as things that are actively ‘made,
maintained and manipulated’ (Proctor, 2008, p. 9). Ultimately, this
suggests that institutional ambiguity can be a potential ‘tool of gov-
ernance and usurpation’ (McGoey, 2012a, p. 10). In the form of en-
abling denial, diverting attention, and exploiting doubt, institutional
ambiguity can be a means to justify inaction and evade responsibility
(McGoey, 2012b, p. 553; Smithson, 2008, p. 223). This directs us to-
wards the importance of the ‘political economy’ of institutional ambi-
guity that revolves around the question of who benefits from specific
modes of governance (and, related to this, who is duped by them).
Exploring the interests behind ambiguous forms of governance can shed
light on the agency behind them.
As scholars working on ‘strategic ambiguity’ have elaborately noted,
the strategic nature of ambiguity is hard to pin down: How, after all, are
we to prove someone does not know or not do something deliberately?
(McGoey, 2012b, p. 559; see also; Best, 2012; Davenport & Leitch,
2005)? Departing from Taussig's dictum that knowing what not to know
is a crucial kind of knowledge, agnotology aims to differentiate between
‘things we don't know we don't know and things we know we don't
know’ (McGoey, 2012b, p. 558). It is the latter form – the things people
know they do not know but do not want to know (deliberate ignorance)
and the things they know but pretend not to know (professed ignor-
ance) – that is relevant to us. While knowledge is power, not admitting
particular issues (such as refugee settlement and registration) into the
realm of knowledge, excluding it from formal policy, and partially re-
legating it to informality, can be a form of power as well. Drawing,
contesting, navigating, or reconstituting the boundaries between formal
and informal ways of governing determines where resources and at-
tention are directed and as such tracks power too (Wylie, 2008, p. 187).
Not-knowing – or not knowing completely or not knowing for sure – can
be genuine, but it can also be maintained or feigned for strategic rea-
sons. As such, not-knowing is closely related to not-acting (Mourad,
2016). Our application of the idea of institutional ambiguity in the
broader field of agnotology sees institutional ambiguity as a result of
feigned not-knowing by authorities which legitimizes the policy inac-
tion that imposes uncertainty on refugee populations.
Considering the argument we make in this article, then, agnotology
is helpful for two reasons. First, by putting a premium on specific issues,
groups, and spaces that are affected by not-knowing and not-acting, it
helps to empirically locate institutional ambiguity. Second, by positing
not-knowing and not-acting as social constructions, it directs us towards
the possible agency and the partially strategic nature of the (re-)pro-
duction of ambiguous governance. The ‘anti-epistemology’ offered by
agnotology allows for a critical analysis of Lebanese policy towards
Syrian refugees that also considers which knowledge is not sought or
disseminated, what decisions are not made and which rules and reg-
ulations are not implemented or upheld (Mourad, 2016). As such, our
point of departure for analyzing the causes, characteristics, and con-
sequences of the institutional ambiguity that shapes the life of Syrian
refugees in Lebanon is Roy’s (2005, p.149) observation that informality,
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and by extension institutional ambiguity, ‘must be understood not as
the object of state regulation but rather as produced by the state itself.’
3. Lebanon's response to the Syrian Refugee crisis
The engagement of the Lebanese state with Syrian refugees primarily
emerges through the General Security Office that falls under the Ministry
of Interior and Municipalities. The General Security is responsible for the
implementation of policy, specifically for monitoring the entry of re-
fugees and controlling their residency and labor status. A Management
Unit was established within the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2013 to
prepare over two hundred existing Social Development Centers in the
country for dealing with refugee issues related to security, health, and
shelter. This Unit, however, did not have any policy-making pre-
rogatives. In 2014, an Inter-Ministerial Crisis Cell was established by the
Council of Ministers. It was chaired by the Prime Minister and included
delegations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior
and Municipalities, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Crisis Cell co-
ordinates with the relevant United Nations (UN) agencies in the context
of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) that was adopted in 2015
and to which we return in detail below. Concerning the LCRP, moreover,
specific ministries – such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of
Health, the Ministry of Energy and Water, and the Ministry of Labor – are
included in sector-oriented interventions. Yet, the Crisis Cell, too, does
not have any policy-making prerogatives: Only ‘the full Council of
Ministers makes the key decisions on SRL [Syrian Refugees in Lebanon]
policy’ (Bidinger et al., 2014, p. 4).
3.1. Characteristics: from ‘no-policy-policy’ to ‘formalizing informality’ and
institutional ambiguity
Lebanon's initial response to the influx of Syrian refugees has been
dubbed a ‘no-policy-policy’ (Ghaddar, 2017; Hamdan & Bou Khater,
2015, p.35; El Mufti, 2014; Nassar, 2014). The evocative term is now
widely used to capture the fact that the Lebanese government originally
had ‘little to no response’ to the refugee crisis (Yassin, Osseiran, Rassi, &
Boustani, 2015, p. 14); that there was a ‘lack of unified government
policy’ (Al Masri, 2015, p. 12). The open border policy for which Le-
banon was praised at the time, according to Boustani, Carpi, Gebara,
and Mourad (2016, p.14), should be seen as ‘ad hoc, as part of a laissez-
faire common-sense approach to refugees fleeing war-torn areas, rather
than a commitment to international law within a policy framework.’ In
an attempt to retain ‘neutrality’ or ‘dissociation’ (Janmyr, 2016, p. 60)
and to prevent the Syrian conflict from spilling over – a key priority
considering that different Lebanese political movements were allied
with the opposing actors in Syria (Ghanem, 2016, p. 19) – there were no
official statements about how the government would approach the
crisis apart from the 2012 Baabda Declaration (Mourad, 2016). This
Declaration did not explicitly mention the refugee crisis, but instead
referred to the broad need for ‘humanitarian solidarity’ in the context of
the Syrian war (Dionigi, 2016, p. 10).7
Lebanon's ‘no-policy-policy’ roughly revolved around a ‘set of no's:’
no refugees and no camps (Frangieh & Barjas, 2016; Mourad, 2016).
With regard to the first ‘no,’ ‘no refugees,’ the Lebanese government has
gone out of its way to avoid recognizing Syrian refugees as refugees.
While Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it
well recognizes that this does not entirely absolve it from the obliga-
tions that hosts states have vis-à-vis refugees under international cus-
tomary law (Hamdan & Bou Khater, 2015; Janmyr, 2016). As such,
rather than acknowledging Syrian refugees as actual refugees, the Le-
banese government considers them ‘guests,’ a term which is inexistent
in international law, ‘displaced persons’ (Janmyr, 2016, p. 59), or, even
more cynically, ‘de facto refugees’ (Janmyr, 2016, p. 62). As Dionigi
(2016, p.23) notes: ‘The government has constantly steered away from
the internationally acknowledged notion of “refugee,” fearing to un-
dertake obligations such a status can demand.’ This approach went as
far as to request UNHRC to stop registering refugees as refugees in 2015
because although these people might be refugees under international
law, they were not according to the newly devised categories of the
Lebanese government (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 5; Levy &
Shamiyeh, 2016, p. 20).
Mourad (2017, p.51) called the second ‘no’ vis-à-vis Syrian refugees,
‘no camps,’ ‘arguably the most critical inaction of the response.’ In
contrast to Jordan – that agreed to the establishment of refugee camps
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – and
Turkey – where the government itself established formal refugee camps
– Lebanon has refused to establish, or allow the establishment of, re-
fugee camps (Sanyal, 2017; Turner, 2015). Despite pleas by humani-
tarian organizations (Knudsen, 2017) and initially favorable positions
by some political parties (Dionigi, 2016, p. 22), the Lebanese govern-
ment was traumatized by the Palestinian refugee experience (Carpi,
Younes, & AbiYaghi, 2016, p. 11). It saw refugee camps as both an
undesirable testimony to the long-term nature of displacement and a
potential security threat due to possibility of such camps to emerge as
terrorist safe havens (Dionigi, 2016, p. 22). As Fakhoury (2017, p.686)
explains, the refusal to allow formal camps was not a form of refugee
inclusion. Rather, denouncing camps became a way to uphold the in-
creasingly delusional idea that the refugee crisis would be short-term
(Ghaddar, 2017).
Since 2014, the notion of ‘no-policy-policy’ revolving around ‘denial
and indifference’ is no longer fully applicable (Atallah, 2016). The type
and degree of policies that have been generated by the Lebanese gov-
ernment since then, however, have conveyed a paradoxical mixture of
extremely stringent and changeable regulations that were not trans-
parently communicated to either the public or humanitarian and de-
velopment partners and that were enforced in a fickle and arbitrary
manner that led Lebanon Support (2016a) to conclude that this policy
in fact formalizes the informality that was produced under the first
phase of ‘no-policy-policy.’ As such, it produced a complex governance
landscape that is defined by its institutional ambiguity.
The watershed moment in Lebanon's refugee response was the
adoption of the LCRP in 2015. The LCRP operationalized the one-page
‘Policy Paper on Syrian Refugee Displacement’ issued by the govern-
ment in October 2014 that prioritized reducing the number of refugees
in the country, implementing extended security measures, and mini-
mizing the burden refugees place on the host society. In his related
speech, Lebanon's Prime Minister presented the initiative as a ‘long-
overdue’ framework to ‘draw the contours of what needs to be done to
mitigate the negative effects of the multi-faceted and protracted crisis
we have been suffering from as a result of the events in Syria’ (Hamdan
& Bou Khater, 2015, p.29). The LCRP formulated official government
policy towards the crisis and aimed to align with existing programs and
projects by humanitarian agencies, such as the UN's annual Regional
Response Plans and national and international NGOs' Collective Site
Management and Coordination Programs. It rests on three strategic
priorities: ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for Syrian
‘de facto’ refugees and the poorest Lebanese; strengthening the asso-
ciated capacity of national and local public service delivery systems;
and supporting Lebanon's economic, social, institutional, and environ-
mental stability (Janmyr, 2016, p. 62; Yassin et al., 2015, p. 18). Fol-
lowing these priorities, the LCRP outlines interventions in nine sectors:
basic assistance; food; shelter; water, sanitation and hygiene; health;
7 Individual ministries communicated several ‘decisions,’ such as the Ministry
of Interior and Municipalities' 2013 ‘Security Plan,’ but these were non-binding
and did not have the status of official policy (Mourad, 2016, p.54). The gov-
ernment also offered some guidelines on how it would deal with the impact of
the refugee presence on its own citizens, as in the 2013 ‘Lebanon Roadmap of
Priority Interventions for Stabilization From the Syrian Conflict’ (Hamdan &
Bou Khater, 2015, p.22). Yet these ‘policies’ systematically ignored the situation
of refugees themselves.
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education; protection; social stability; livelihoods; and security.
While constituting a departure of the ‘no-policy-policy’ in terms of
format – where there was no formal policy before, there is now – in
terms of content the October 2014 policy and the LCRP in many ways
made official the de facto situation that had emerged during the ‘no-
policy-policy’ years. This process of ‘formalizing informality’ (Lebanon
Support, 2016a) is evident in two main ways. On the one hand, the
LCRP formulates incredibly stringent regulations in terms of entry, re-
sidence, and labor. On the other hand, these regulations are not clearly
communicated and arbitrarily enforced. The result is that the un-
certainty and capriciousness that blossomed under the ‘no-policy-
policy’ proliferated into a situation of endemic institutional ambiguity.
As Janmyr (2016, p.66) demonstrates, the Syrian refugee crisis in Le-
banon is not governed by law but by ‘ministerial decrees, orders, and
circulars,’ ‘irregular decisions’ (Hamdan & Bou Khater, 2015, p.34) that
enable the government to sidestep national law as well as bilateral
agreements and leaves a lot of room for discretion (Aranki & Kalis,
2014; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Several Syrian and Lebanese re-
spondents in Qob Elias and Bebnine expressed their frustration with the
inconsistent way in which the refugee crisis was being handled. They
mentioned that the arbitrary implementation or outright violation of
policies related to the Syrian refugee presence allowed for a gray
economy to flourish and, in their view, consolidated institutional and
legal uncertainties.
The October 2014 policy paper that preceded the LCRP, for in-
stance, takes the previous tendency to minimize the number of de jure
refugees by not recognizing them as refugees one step further. It bluntly
states that the government aims to reduce the actual number of Syrian
refugees in the country through reducing access and encouraging return
(Janmyr, 2016, p. 62; Lebanon Support, 2016a, p.9). Syrians are now
only allowed to enter Lebanon if they can prove that their stay fits a
specific entry category, even though the categorization in question has
been carefully designed to bar Syrian refugees: Only one out of nine
categories speaks of displaced and this category explicitly excludes
those fleeing the conflict in Syria. All these categories require refugees
to produce elaborate and specified documentation before being allowed
entry (Lebanon Support, 2016a, p.10). Obtaining these documents is
incredibly difficult, time-consuming, and expensive and thus practically
excludes all refugees without substantial financial means (Janmyr,
2016, p. 67). People that managed to enter Lebanon before these reg-
ulations were in place or who managed to enter despite them face
daunting instructions to renew their residency (or to regularize it if they
entered Lebanon illegally) as well.
Biannual residency renewal costs amount to US$200,- per person,
an entirely unrealistic sum for most refugee families. On top of these
financial challenges, refugees are to provide a housing commitment (in
the form of certified copies of a lease agreement or real estate deed and
a certified attestation from a mukhtar that the landlord from which the
housing is rented indeed owns the property or a certified residency
statement by the municipality) that is in practice almost impossible to
obtain due to landlords' unwillingness to engage in this procedure
(Janmyr, 2016, p.68–69). In addition to this documentation on housing,
refugees registered with UNHCR need to prove this registration and
provide a pledge not to work signed by a notary and a demonstration of
financial means. Refugees not registered with UNHRC face the even
more disheartening task to obtain a pledge of responsibility by a Le-
banese sponsor (kafeel) (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 14). As
sponsors take on full liability for the refugees they support and the
related bureaucracy is burdensome, such sponsors are very hard to find
for refugees (Janmyr, 2016, p. 69; Al Masri, 2015, p.11).
Whilst the policies developed since October 2014 thus make the life
of Syrians in Lebanon a lot harder, at first sight they at least appear to
provide clarity on the Lebanese formal response to the crisis. However,
as Lebanon Support’s (2016a, p.22) seminal report on ‘formal in-
formality’ demonstrates, there was a systematic ‘incoherence, in-
formality, and insecurity in the renewal process.’ In our reading of this
paradoxical notion, ‘formal informality’ does not suggest that in-
formalities are officially acknowledged, addressed, or remedied. Ra-
ther, it highlights the ways in which informal realities are imposed,
facilitated, and entrenched through (gaps and inconsistencies in) formal
policies – which is in line with the mutual constitution of formal and
informal institutions that we started out from above. The interpretation
and implementation of laws is constantly in the process of being
adapted and amended without being properly communicated. Amnesty
International (2015:15), for instance, notes that, when investigating the
case of refugees who were turned back because their documents were
only valid for a certain number of days after being stamped, it ‘could
not find any information on official deadlines related to documents for
renewing residency.’ The exceptional ‘humanitarian cases’ under which
those fleeing Syria might be granted entry under the LCRP (through the
category referring to ‘displaced persons’) after all, to give another ex-
ample, have not been made publicly available (Al Masri, 2015, p. 13).
Bidinger et al. (2014, p.36) explain that the same goes for the ‘petition
for mercy’ that people who have irregularly entered the country can
submit. This petition, in addition to a payment of US$600,-, should
regularize their status, but ‘the success of such petition is entirely un-
certain, as there are no policies or guidelines for the exercise of dis-
cretion by the GSO [General Security Office], and applicants cannot be
represented by counsel in their proceedings’ (Bidinger et al., 2014,
p. 36).
Instead of providing lucidity, then, the formalization of Lebanon's
response to the Syrian refugee crisis has made the situation more am-
bivalent (Dionigi, 2016, p. 16) as it is based on illusory requirements
that set people up for illegality (Lebanon Support, 2016a, p.15). In-
stitutional ambiguity is only further entrenched by the arbitrary im-
plementation and enforcement of regulations through, as the Ministry
of Social Affairs euphemistically puts it, the use of ‘windows of flex-
ibility’ (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 11). Entry, as noted above, is
dependent on the relevant officer's interpretation of the ‘humanitarian
case’ clause of the category on displaced persons in the LCRP. Renewal
of residency status is similarly at the discretion of the General Security
officer in question, with ample testimonies of renewals being denied
despite the presentation of all required documentation (Janmyr, 2016).
Fakhoury (2017, p.687) concludes that the General Security has im-
plemented a form of ‘discretionary governance’ through its ‘restrictive,
tedious and changing’ procedures. According to a refugee quoted by
Lebanon Support (2016a, p.23): ‘It's a lot of chaos. The people who
work at General Security don't know anything about the laws.’ On the
ground, each General Security officer demands a different set of
documents (Lebanon Support, 2016a, p.22-3). Al Masri (2015, p.11)
concludes: ‘Lebanese and Syrians alike described the regulations of the
General Security as fickle and ambiguous, and appeared trapped in a
bureaucratic maze they do not know how to navigate.’ A refugee cited
by Lebanon Support (2016a, p.22) explains:
I tried to renew two times with a kafeel, but it didn't work. For some
people this works, for others it doesn't. The third time, I tried to
renew with a renting contract. That also didn't work. I remember
that the first time I wanted residency on the basis of a kafeel, I went
to the General Security six times, and every time they told me to get
different papers. They said that they couldn't have told me I needed
these papers before, because they ‘didn't know.’ In the end, I was so
frustrated that I started shouting at them. Then, a general came and
gave me a copy of my kafeel's pledge. I took it and went to the no-
tary, but that didn't work either. So I went back to the General
Security. Then they told me to come at 8 a.m. When I did, they told
me to come at 12 p.m. In the end, I just gave up, just like the others.
This arbitrariness is also evident at checkpoints, those ‘flying’ hall-
marks of spatial exclusion and control (Isleyen, 2018, p. 27), where
even people with proper documentation might be arrested. According
to a human rights activist, mobility entirely ‘depends on the mood of
the guy at the checkpoint.’8
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While the LCRP had the stated aim to ‘formalize, control and
monitor’ the Syrian presence in Lebanon (Lebanon Support, 2016a,
p.9), this formalization paradoxically resulted in increased informality
and illegality. More than half of the Syrians in Lebanon are now without
valid status papers (Janmyr, 2016, p. 72). This difficulty, often im-
possibility, to legalize their stay is a major concern for refugees who feel
they are ‘forced to break the law because the Lebanese government
didn't give us another choice’ (refugee cited in Lebanon Support, 2016b,
p.34; see also Dionigi, 2016, p.26).
3.2. Consequences: marginalization, fragmentation, and securitization
The response of the Lebanese government to the Syrian refugee
crisis has thus evolved from a passive ‘no-policy-policy’ logic to a stance
that actively produces informality. This development culminated in a
situation of institutional ambiguity that has marginalized refugees,
fragmented the humanitarian response, and securitized the approach of
national and local authorities.
3.2.1. Marginalization
Institutional ambiguity has greatly contributed to the vulnerability
of Lebanon's Syrian refugees. The refusal of the Lebanese government to
acknowledge refugees as refugees and refugees' de facto exclusion from
legal residency has placed them outside the legal protection that these
statuses should provide (Knudsen, 2017; Thorleifson, 2014). The sub-
sequent formalization of the informality that was generated by the in-
itial ‘no-policy-policy’ led to yet other forms of vulnerability. In this
sense, legal and institutional ambiguity have created a ‘protection gap’
that enables vulnerability which in turn facilitates exploitation. In-
stitutional ambiguity thereby abandons refugees to extreme forms of
marginalization and abuse.
The combination of severe regulation and arbitrary enforcement has
made Syrian refugees in Lebanon extremely dependent on Lebanese
landlords, sponsors, notaries, and (local) state authorities (particularly
makhatir, municipalities, and General Security officials) to obtain the
relevant documentation and the related ‘lenience’ to get this doc-
umentation ‘accepted.’ This opens the door to widespread exploitation
in terms or residency and labor and, in effect, a range of human rights
violations (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 5). Syrian participants in a
focus group conducted in Bebnine explained their complete dependence
on the ‘goodwill’ of their employer: ‘Sometimes they even don't pay us
at all. What can we do?’9 As we discuss in more detail in the subsequent
section, there are ample accounts of harassment, abuse, and mistreat-
ment of refugees at the hands of sponsors, employers and landlords (Al
Masri, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015; Lebanon Support, 2016b).
Syrians in Lebanon fear leaving their shelters because of the possi-
bility of being arrested at a checkpoint and their ‘illegality’ thus se-
verely limits their freedom of movement. Many Syrians interviewed
explained how cautious they became following the implementation of
the policies. One refugee living in an informal settlement in Zahle said:
‘I now avoid to commute and take jobs outside the locality where I
live.10 An NGO manager from the Bekaa explained how, after the is-
suing of the October Policy, Syrian refugees ‘are scared to work illeg-
ally, especially in the rural areas where they can be easily identified and
arrested.’11 Yet, focus groups conducted in Bebnine and Qab Elias in-
dicated that ultimately refugees' survival strategies trump their fears
and they generally take the risk to work and commute despite the
possibility of being arrested.12 Thus, while these policies have
cultivated continuous feelings of fear and uncertainty among Syrians,
they are at the same time ineffective in reaching their formally stated
aim. This is partly the case because alternative modes of employment
are generally impossible to access due to the convoluted and constantly
shifting bureaucratic maze created in this regard. One Lebanese parti-
cipant to our focus groups for instance reported not being able to
sponsor his Syrian assistant because he was asked to provide property
deeds.9 The precarious legal situation that follows from the illusory
regulations and associated Kafkaesque bureaucracy deprives refugees
from ‘enrolment in public schools, opening a bank account, and ac-
quiring lawful employment’ (Janmyr, 2016, p. 73).13
The ‘no-camp-policy’ has exacerbated this fundamental insecurity
that follows from refugees' illegalization. It has made them even more
vulnerable to raids and evictions and exploitation by landowners and
shawishes, the de facto camp commanders of informal Syrian refugee
settlements (Ghaddar, 2017). Thus, while the vulnerability produced by
institutional ambiguity encompasses all Syrian refugees in Lebanon,
and while self-settled refugees in urban settings face important spatial
insecurity as well, the spatial manifestations of institutional ambiguity
are particularly pertinent in the informal settlements we studied. Since
the beginning of 2015 until October of the same year, 115 informal
settlements sheltering 18,000 individuals were evicted throughout Le-
banon (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, 2015). In April 2017, the Lebanese Army ordered the eviction of
10,000 refugees from informal settlements in the Bekaa (Ayoub, 2017).
In Riyaq town alone, 142 sites or 12,655 individuals were evicted in
May 2017 (UNHCR, 2017).
3.2.2. Fragmentation
In addition to this marginalization of Syrian refugees in Lebanon,
the initial absence and later ambiguity of government policy have also
fragmented the response that did emerge (Fakhoury, 2017, p. 690;
Ghaddar, 2017; Mourad, 2016). The UNHCR, national and interna-
tional NGOs, and local organizations progressively stretched their
mandate to fill the gaps left by the government. The UNHCR took the
leadership in developing and implementing annual Regional Response
Plans long before the government agreed to coordinate interventions
through the LCRP. Yet the combination of a huge number of donors and
stakeholders, some of them recently established and many falling out-
side the UNHCR coordination system, and the absence of (coherent)
government policy meant that ‘the mandate of humanitarian organi-
zations in the country remained poorly defined’ and resulted in per-
vasive duplication and inefficiencies (Boustani et al., 2016, p. 14). NGO
managers unanimously reported that the fragmented landscape of co-
ordination and the large number of actors operating in such a small
country hindered the implementation of an efficient response
strategy.14 Coordination of various projects and programs was reported
to be ‘flaky’ and exceptionally challenging in the absence of a clear
official policy such as those in place in other host countries in the region
(Boustani et al., 2016, p. 8). The lack of legal status of refugees and the
informal nature of the settlements in which they stay have tre-
mendously hampered organizations' efforts to improve living condi-
tions.
The ‘no-camp-policy’ specifically proved to be challenging to the
humanitarian response. The formal position against camps did not
8 Interview by Jessy Nassar – Beirut, 13 August 2014.
9 Jessy Nassar and others – Bebnine, 13 February 2016.
10 Interview by Jessy Nassar – Zahle, 21 August 2015.
11 Conducted by Jessy Nassar and others – 12 February 2016.
12 Since obtaining a birth certificate requires valid legal status, this also
means that Syrian children born in Lebanon risk statelessness (Norwegian
(footnote continued)
Refugee Council (NRC), 2013, p.6; see also Albarazi & Van Waas, 2016).
Janmyr (2016, p.73) cites a 2014 survey that estimated that 72 per cent of
Syrian refugee newborns in Lebanon did not have an official birth certificate
because the parents could not fulfill the associated bureaucratic requirements.
This situation generates intolerable psychological stress and related health and
social problems (p.1; Shawaf & El Asmar, 2017).
13 Interviews by Jessy Nassar – Beirut, 21 July 2014, 11 August 2015, 2
November 2015 and 8 March 2016.
14 Interview by Jessy Nassar – Bar Elias, 11 August 2015.
J. Nassar, N. Stel Political Geography 70 (2019) 44–54
49
prevent the emergence of thousands of informal camps, or ‘tented set-
tlements’ that spread across the North and the Bekaa in an unorganized
manner. In 2016, 41 per cent of Lebanon's Syrian refugees lived in
shelters that did not meet the minimum humanitarian standards, twelve
per cent were sheltered in non-residential structures like shops, garages,
and worksites, and seventeen per cent were based in informal tented
settlements (UNHCR, United Nations Children Fund and World Food
Program, 2016, p.19). The absence of official camps – especially in
combination with the absence of a coherent policy and the over-
whelming lack of legal status of refugees – has increased the difficulty
for humanitarian organizations to provide for refugees (El Mufti, 2014).
Because self-settled refugees and those in informal settlements do not
have recourse to law in case they are evicted (Knudsen, 2017), their
protection becomes precarious (Thorleifson, 2014).
3.2.3. Securitization
Institutional ambiguity has not just marginalized refugees and
fragmented the overall response, it has also resulted in a securitization
process that further contributes to refugees' vulnerability (Ghaddar,
2017; Mourad, 2016). In 2014, Lebanon's President designated the
presence of an overwhelming number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon an
‘existential threat.’ (Dionigi, 2016, p. 20). The perception of Syrian
refugees as predominantly a security threat (rather than a humanitarian
problem) has, for instance, been one of the foundations under the ‘no-
camp-policy:’ large concentrations of refugees were to be avoided for
fear of becoming ‘terrorist hotbeds’ (Turner, 2015). This national se-
curitization of refugees has had severe consequences locally. Scholars
and practitioners agree that Lebanon's municipalities have accom-
plished a lot in the face of limited resources, capacities, and instructions
and donors and humanitarian agencies have described municipalities as
‘among the best local partners in their intervention to support the crisis’
(Boustani, 2014; see also; Boustani et al., 2016). Defying national ‘no-
policy-policy,’ municipalities were placed at the interface between re-
fugees and the humanitarian agencies assisting them and often took on
a leading role in the de facto administration of refugees and the man-
agement of their everyday affairs.
This positive role notwithstanding, in the absence of a central
guideline on how to respond, the pressure that informal settlements put
on local communities and infrastructures has made local authorities and
communities consider refugees a threat (Ghanem, 2016, p. 42). The
securitization of the response, for instance, has led the owner and
manager of a big tented settlement in Bar Elias to install security
cameras to monitor refugees.15 Such strategies have sometimes led to a
local duplication of the national securitization of refugees. Many mu-
nicipalities have imposed illegal curfews to control refugees' mobility.
Even where such curfews are not actually implemented, as in Bebnine
and Qob Elias, Syrians were still reluctant to commute, especially at
night, illustrating how it is exactly the uncertainty produced by such
measures – Is this curfew legal? Should I heed it? Will it be enforced
formally? If not, could it be informally used as a pretext for abuse? –
that has a disciplining effect on refugees. Raids are also sporadically
conducted to close down shops that were opened without official per-
mission, even if such shops usually reached agreements with Lebanese
owners, and municipalities condone street patrols and vigilante justice
implemented by militias (Carpi et al., 2016; Fakhoury, 2017, p. 687;
Human Rights Watch, 2014; Nassar, 2014). Although these measures
are illegal, local authorities often publically announce them and are not
kept in check by national authorities in this regard.16
4. Causes: ‘no-policy-policy’ and ‘formal informality’ as
manifestations of strategic institutional ambiguity
Above we have described the characteristics and consequences of
the ‘no-policy-policy’ and the ‘formalizing informality’ policy that have
determined the Lebanese government's response to the Syrian refugee
crisis. In this section, we are concerned with the causes of this in-
stitutional ambiguity. We argue that the current focus on the lack of
capacity and resources that the Lebanese government has at its disposal
tells only part of the story. There is also a more strategic agency to this
response that has revolved around the core aims of ‘encouraging’ as
many refugees as possible to leave and shirking responsibility for those
that remain.
The ‘no-policy-policy’ and the formalization of informality are often
seen to be the result of a lack of financial resources and human capa-
cities on the one hand and the sectarian nature of Lebanon's political
system and the concomitant politicization of the refugee crisis on the
other hand. Fakhoury (2017) explains Lebanon's refugee response as a
one-on-one consequence of what she calls ‘the defining dynamics of the
country's politics of sectarianism:’ slack governance, fractured and an-
tagonistic elites, and dependence on non-state actors (see also Dionigi,
2016, p. 12; Hamdan & Bou Khater, 2015, p.34; Levy & Shamiyeh,
2016; Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014; Shawaf & El Asmar, 2017, p.8).
Ghaddar (2017) concludes that ‘political deadlock due to intense poli-
tical fragmentation continues to deny any concrete plan to accom-
modate the huge population influx.’ Many policies were drafted but
failed to be adopted (let alone implemented) due to this. As Boustani
et al. (2016, p.10) describe, for instance, the response plan presented by
the government in December 2012, which was concerned with dis-
tributing various tasks to different ministries, stranded because the
acting cabinet resigned and the following cabinet failed to adopt it. This
paralysis and inability is exacerbated by the fact that Lebanon is still
struggling to recover from a range of wars (from the 1975–1990 Civil
War to the 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel) and faces a huge
national debt (Hamdan & Bou Khater, 2015, p.34). In short, as Dionigi
(2016, p.10) sums up this reading of Lebanon's refugee response, Le-
banon's capacities in terms of infrastructure and know-how are simply
insufficient to deal with a crisis of this magnitude.
We do not contest the importance of this set of explanations. Our
fieldwork corroborates that a lack of capacity, funds, and political and
institutional ‘infrastructure’ certainly account for a large extent of the
response that we have here captured as ‘no-policy-policy’ and ‘for-
malizing informality.’ What we suggest, however, is that this explana-
tion is necessary but insufficient to understand the emergence and
persistence of the institutional ambiguity we described. In addition to a
lack of (political) ability, we argue, a lack of political will to develop a
constructive and effective response is indispensable in understanding
the current situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. In a way, the turn to
‘no-policy-policy’ and ‘formalizing informality’ constitutes a response in
its own right. In this, we build on our own empirical findings and on
others' acute analysis of the ways in which ‘state inaction’ affected re-
fugees, local authorities, and international agencies (Mourad, 2016,
p.49; Saghieh, 2015). As also recognized by Sanyal (2017, p.120), for
instance, the ambiguous encampment manifested in informal settle-
ments ‘emerged out of the tacit approval of the state’ that is not merely
unable but also ‘unwilling to shoulder the burden of refugees.’
Institutional ambiguity need not be inherently maleficent.
Authorities can also extend it to create leeway for refugees and their
‘looking away’ may be benign rather than exclusively aiming to mar-
ginalize refugees. Refugees themselves, moreover, might utilize the
blurred boundary between formality and informality in creative and
subversive ways (Bayat, 1997; Stel, 2015a, 2016). However, for our
case-study at hand, as we have shown, the governing effect of institu-
tional ambiguity overwhelmingly works to the benefit of those with
power rather than the subaltern. In Lebanon, the initial ‘no-policy-
policy’ was, in essence, a manifestation of the ostrich syndrome that
15 Interviews by Jessy Nassar – Beirut, 2015 and 2016.
16 Interview by Jessy Nassar – Beirut, 18 July 2014.
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assumes that if one just ignores a problem it will eventually disappear
(Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). Not to recognize refugees, not to establish
camps, and not to develop regulations, was, at first, a way of dodging a
politically sensitive issue and legal responsibility at the same time.
The subsequent policy of formalizing informality, however, seems to
have had the aim to discourage new refugees from entering and to
encourage existing refugees to leave through a ‘strangulation’ ap-
proach, a campaign to produce what Davies and Isakjee (2015, p.93)
have called ‘deliberate indignity’ and to make refugees' life so pre-
carious, unpredictable, and insecure that they at all costs avoid long-
term settlement. Vulnerability and existential uncertainty of refugees
have served as a potent strategy to discourage new refugees to come to
Lebanon and to encourage residing refugees to leave. Even if it is im-
possible for most Syrians to return to their home country, Syrians in-
terviewed across Lebanon confirmed how restrictions on their mobility,
residency, and right to work affects their lives and plans. The illegal yet
formalized imposition of curfews is one example of how this translates
at the local level; although curfews imposed in localities including
Bebnine and Qob Elias were not really implemented, they successfully
limited the movement of Syrians especially at night, and made them
feel their presence is undesirable.
Policy-makers surely realize the futility of these policies when as-
sessed in a traditional sense. As Bidinger et al. (2014, p.42) note: ‘If
most people cannot afford to pay the renewal fee and choose to re-enter
Lebanon or reside without valid permits, then the fee serves no useful
purpose. It only acts as a means of exercising control and instilling fear.’
This – instilling fear –, however, may well be the real purpose of such
policies as it paves the way for the ultimate aim to ‘encourage’ refugees
to leave. Crucially, Lebanon's October 2014 policy paper explicitly
states that one of the three core priorities of the government is to reduce
the number of refugees in the country ‘by all possible means.’ As
Frangieh (2014, 2017) demonstrates, one of these means is the leveling
of ambiguous and arbitrary residency and detention regimes which
produces the uncertainty and vulnerability that would make refugees
leave Lebanon. Thus, the Lebanese government's stated policy priority
regarding the Syrian refugee crisis – the desirability of imminent return
of refugees being one of the few things Lebanon's contending political
powers in principle agree on – is conveniently served by the evident
consequences of institutional ambiguity and its policy ‘evasion’ and
‘gaps’ (Atallah & Mahdi, 2017, p. 9). This further illustrates the strategic
nature of institutional ambiguity for Lebanon's governing elites.
An advisor to the Minister of Interior actually acknowledged that
one of the government's strategies ‘is to make refugees feel that they are
not living a good life; the more they are living in a deprived way, the
faster they will be forced to leave.’17 As Aranki and Kalis (2014) argue,
the constant situation of ‘being in limbo for refugee status’ (Latham,
2010, p. 187) forces Syrians to either accept deportation or expose
themselves to new risks as a result of being forced underground. This
analysis is corroborated by Parkinson and Behrouzan (2015, p.329)
who describe the way in which ‘members of the cabinet and party
leaders have publicly emphasized their desire to deport refugees from
Syria and/or disincentivize further refugee flight to Lebanon.’ NGOs
have also increasingly voiced their experience that ‘the Lebanese gov-
ernment is purposefully making life more difficult for refugees with the
hope that it encourages them to leave quicker’ (Levy & Shamiyeh, 2016,
p. 36). Amnesty International (2015, p.26) suggests that the ‘onerous
requirements introduced by Lebanon appear to be part of a deliberate
policy to deny refugee status to people fleeing Syria and to reduce the
number of refugees in Lebanon by making life there next to impossible.’
Ghanem (2016, p.55), too, understands the ‘selectivity and nebulous-
ness’ that characterize the application of the LCRP categories for entry
as a tactical approach to force refugees out of the country.
As ‘no-policy-policy’ shifted towards the formalization of
informality, moreover, the functionality and tenacity of the institu-
tional ambiguity generated by the government's inaction and ambiguity
was further entrenched. The exploitation of Syrian refugees that we
described as a consequence of institutional ambiguity above has served
various stakeholders that can now be assumed to have an interest in
maintaining institutional ambiguity to protect these interests. A wide
array of ‘middlemen’ and brokers has surfaced as indispensable to the
informal governance systems and flourishing gray economy through
which refugees seek to access shelter, livelihoods, services, and security
(Lebanon Support, 2016b, p.23).
Institutional ambiguity paved the way for uncontrolled profit-
making as landlords increased rent prices on Syrians as well as
Lebanese households. As noted above, it has also generated tremendous
power in the hands of Lebanese acting as sponsors to Syrian refugees
looking for legal labor status, resulting in a relation Janmyr (2016,
p.76) describes as ‘analogous to a parent and child, or alternatively,
master and slave.’ Lebanon Support (2016a, p.19) similarly stresses that
‘as Syrians’ legal status is conditional upon these kafeels, employers and
brokers, it puts them in a position of power.’ Shawishes, according to Al
Masri (2016:16) ‘are often complicit in the exploitation of Syrian day
labourers and in allowing for the harassment or exploitation of Syrian
refugee women.’ For Ghaddar (2017), this is a direct result of the Le-
banese government's ‘problematic, ad hoc’ approach to the crisis that
‘allows informal security actors, such as the Shawishes, to thrive in Le-
banon's informal refugee camps.’
Focus groups confirmed the expansion of illegal businesses such as
selling donations and aid, human smuggling to Europe, sponsorship
facilitation processes, exploitation of Syrian tenants in formal and in-
formal settlements, and embezzlement of aid and assistance. This
‘business’ dimension of informal governance systems emerges through
informal networks and connections with political parties, as in Qob
Elias and Bar Elias, or with tribal leaders, like in Bebnine. Both Syrians
and host communities complained that some Lebanese take shares of
the assistance distributed to refugees and sell them for an inflated price,
take commission fees on services they provide to refugees and NGOs,
and demand sexual services in return for money or aid.18 According to
refugees and key informants, these profiteers are often connected to the
municipality which is in its turn backed by a political party or alli-
ance.19
The institutional ambiguity convenient for national state authorities
and local middlemen was further anchored as it was reproduced by the
humanitarian agencies working within this vague and conflicted in-
stitutional system and by refugees themselves. Various humanitarian
organizations mentioned the urge to work around the system when a
response from the national level remained absent mostly using informal
networks and Lebanese connections.20 Our focus group data brought to
light that especially new donors seem to be disrupting attempts by
INGOs to implement a formal mechanism of aid delivery that contains
abusive practices.21 Instead of following a strategy for aid distribution,
they delegate distribution to individuals who are randomly appointed
based on personal connections. Furthermore, focus group discussants
17 By author and others – Qob Elias and Bebnine, February 2016.
18 Interviews by Jessy Nassar – Bar Elias, March and August 2015; Bebnine,
12 February 2016. It should be noted that access to services and resources also
depends on the nature of the shelter where refugees reside. Fieldwork in Bar
Elias has for instance revealed that those who live in more organized settle-
ments which are managed by donors including charitable and faith-based in-
stitutions from the GCC (such as Awde camp) are much more connected and
assisted than the informal settlements which were not ‘adopted’ by any orga-
nization (like Tal Al-Sarhoun, the biggest informal settlement in Bar Elias). In
other words, this conclusion only proves how the settlements which are more
connected to political parties or unconventional donors are the ones that re-
ceive most of the attention.
19 Interviews by Jessy Nassar – Beirut, 2015.
20 Interview by Jessy Nassar, 12 February 2016.
21 By Jessy Nassar and others – Bebnine, 12 February 2016.
J. Nassar, N. Stel Political Geography 70 (2019) 44–54
51
and interviewees confirmed that the more well-connected Syrians are,
the higher their chances to receive aid. The selection of ‘beneficiaries’ is
not only dependent on personal and economic interests but also on
gender-based discrimination. It was also repeatedly mentioned that
these focal points distribute only a part of the aid received and use the
rest to make profit.22
Local authorities also benefit from the exploitative political
economy produced by institutional ambiguity. Municipalities play an
indirect role in channeling aid, often through political parties whose
institutional boundaries with municipal officials are blurred. In many
instances, the involvement of municipalities in aid politics takes the
form of negotiations between them and donors. For example, while
UNHCR and partner agencies make concessions with local authorities
through the implementation of infrastructural projects, authorities
promise that they will keep handling the burden of refugees in return.
Makhatir also saw their position increase in relevance as a result of the
rising demand for personal status papers and legal documents from the
refugee community (Stel, 2015b).23 One of the makhatir interviewed in
Qob Elias reported that the closer the mukhtar is to the party in power,
the easier it is for them to facilitate and serve the community.24
As such, our empirical findings show that Lebanese and Syrians are
both victims of the loose socio-political and economic systems where
laws are arbitrarily implemented, violated, and consistently abused. As
a result, refugees also replicate ambiguity in order to cope with their
everyday precariousness, as for instance illustrated by residents' strug-
gles to access electricity in the informal settlement of Qob Elias.
Municipal police regularly conduct inspections during which illegally
installed electricity lines are cut down. The refugees, however, always
reinstall the old networks. As a resident of Qob Elias explained, state
and refugees co-create informality as there is an ‘unspoken agreement
between the police and the refugees that the former will continue to
stop the violations every now and then while knowing that the latter
will always reinstall the illegal lines the next day.’25 Refugees from the
Bekaa similarly found that the hazardous nature of the state's response
drives them to reproduce the system that governs them by relying on
informal networks and channels to access different types of services
such as health care, education, employment, and housing.25 Our em-
pirical insights thus confirm Ghaddar’s (2017) conclusion that the ‘non-
existent national refugee policy and a proliferation of poorly co-
ordinated emergency response plans by international aid organizations
were met with strong, illegal, and hybrid networks.’
Policies aimed at governing refugee spaces and communities may
thus not always, as is routinely assumed, respond to informality or in-
stitutional ambiguity, but at times seek to produce or maintain it. Even
if institutional ambiguity may have not been strategically pursued from
the outset, it has become closely tied to the interests of both old and
new ‘strongmen.’ Not making policy, not recognizing refugees, not es-
tablishing camps, may then be the most effective way to force refugees
to leave and to avoid responsibility for those that do not. Generating
uncertainty and insecurity by ambiguous and arbitrarily enforced
measures could be an equally potent alternative strategy towards the
same end. As such, institutional ambiguity may be a way for the
Lebanese government to produce what Frangieh (2016, p.38) has called
a ‘state-to-UN responsibility shift’ and constitutes a particular form of
Fakhoury’s (2017, p.683) ‘politics of outsourcing.’
5. Reflections and implications
Faced with the arrival of an estimated 1.5 million refugees, Lebanon
is doing much more than could reasonably be asked from the already
tormented country. Understanding how Lebanon governs the refugee
crisis it currently faces is of profound relevance. The response of the
Lebanese government has evolved from a ‘no-policy-policy’ that refused
to give refugees legal status, rejected the establishment of official re-
fugee camps, and avoided official regulation to a formalization of this
informality by a combination of stringent entry and residency regula-
tions with confusing communication, regular changes, and arbitrary
enforcement. This development from inaction to ambivalent action on
behalf of the Lebanese state has resulted in a situation of institutional
ambiguity that contributes to the marginalization of refugees, the
fragmentation of the humanitarian response, and the securitization of
local engagement between host and refugee communities.
This institutional ambiguity is usually explained through references
to the inevitable chaos that emerges in the wake of major crises, the
lack of financial as well as human resources of the Lebanese state, and
Lebanon's dysfunctional political system that is characterized by
chronic deadlock and paralysis. Whereas we do not challenge the im-
portance of these structural explanations, this article has suggested that
we need to take into account an additional set of explanations that
depart from a more agency-oriented and strategic positioning. We have
demonstrated that institutional ambiguity has served as a tactic to ef-
fectively expel refugees (by forcing refugees into illegality and ren-
dering them extremely vulnerable to Lebanese as well as Syrian ‘mid-
dlemen’) and evade responsibility for dealing with them. We have
shown that the ‘not acting’ that served as the foundation of the ‘no-
policy-policy’ and the ‘not knowing’ that underpins the arbitrary im-
plementation of the policies that have been adopted serve entrenched
socio-economic and political interests. Institutional ambiguity, then,
should, to a degree, be considered as a governance strategy in its own
right.
This insight was enabled by reading our empirical material as well
as the existing literature and documentation through an agnotological
lens. Agnotology theory allows a shift away from the dichotomous
ideal-types captured by the categories of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ towards
the idea of institutional ambiguity, which better reflects the multiplicity
and volatility of everyday governance in situations often labeled as
‘informal.’ Agnotology urged us to explore institutional ambiguity not
as the absence of regulation or documentation but as the exclusion from
state regulation and documentation. This puts state responsibility at the
centre stage and demands a more political reading of the ‘state aban-
donment’ and ‘violent inaction’ (Davies et al., 2017) constituted by
state-produced informality and ambiguity (Roy, 2005). As state re-
presentatives and experts have repeatedly acknowledged in the context
of our own and others' research, institutional ambiguity serves a pur-
pose for the central government by allowing it to avoid responsibility.
In addition, it has by now become part of a perverse status quo in which
it is reproduced by local authorities, humanitarian organizations, and
refugees themselves.
This ‘ambiguous exercise of power’ (Oesch, 2017, p. 11) or ‘agno-
politics’ (Davies et al., 2017, p. 14) in the context of the Syrian refugee
crisis in Lebanon has conceptual as well as applied implications for
debates on the politics of migration. It furthers our understanding of the
political utility of what Kuusisto-Arponen and Gilmartin (2015, p.143)
call the ‘precarious refugee’ that is produced through ‘permanent spaces
of politico-administrative limbos.’ It does so by empirically sub-
stantiating how and why processes of ‘narrowing legality’ and ‘produ-
cing illegality’ serve socio-economic and political interests (Gorman,
2017, p. 40). This underscores how such dynamics border and exclude
particular populations and it conceptualizes refugees' need to ‘con-
tinually engage with an unpredictable slew of temporary and ad hoc
legal remedies’ as an imposed governmentality rather than a con-
tingency of displacement (Gorman, 2017, p. 44). There is increasing
attention for the role that ambiguity, risk, and unpredictability plays in
refugee life. Within the refugee studies literature, however, this atten-
tion is directed first and foremost to refugees' lived experience of
22 Interviews by Jessy Nassar – Bebnine and Qob Elias, February 2016.
23 Interview by Jessy Nassar and others – Qob Elias, 18 February 2016.
24 Focus group discussion by author and others – Qob Elias, 18 February
2016.
25 Interviews by Jessy Nassar – Qob Elias and Bebnine, February 2016.
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uncertainty. We have complemented these emerging insights by enga-
ging with Horst and Grabska’s (2015, p.6) call to extend such attention
to the ‘considerable role’ of uncertainty in the ‘systems that govern the
displaced.’ Building on Katz’s (2016:154) consideration of the ways in
which Israel has used ‘governance strategies of ordered disorder and
strategic confusion’ to discipline Palestinian refugees and further its
own stateness and inspired by Biehl’s (2015) analysis of the ways in
which Turkey uses unpredictability to pacify refugees, we have furth-
ered conceptual thinking beyond the ways in which refugees deal with
uncertainty to the ways in which authorities govern through un-
certainty.
By using agnotology as heuristic lens to tease out the strategic
components of the ambiguous modes of governance that are used to
deal with refugee populations and spaces, we build on and extend
earlier work on the agnotology-refugeeness nexus by Stel (2015a, 2016)
and show that ‘the politics of uncertainty’ do not just inform evictions in
informal Palestinian refugee settlements, as she demonstrates, but are
far more encompassing in Lebanon's governance of refugee spaces and
populations. These insights reiterate the importance of critical, in-
dependent, and political analyses of issues related to migration and
refugeeness (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, & Sigona, 2014, p. 16).
In refugee studies, infamous for its all too tight relations to policy-
making (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p. 4), institutional ambiguity is
routinely regarded as an unfortunate by-product of limited resources or
misguided rationales that undermine authorities' attempts to formally
govern the refugee presence in a particular country (Bakewell, 2008).
We have exposed this perspective as insufficient and point towards the
agential elements of ambiguity. Policy-makers and practitioners
working to assist refugees and the governments of the countries that
host them need to acknowledge this potentially strategic – and there-
fore likely even more complex and tenacious – nature of the institu-
tional ambiguity they encounter in their work. Mapping the ‘political
economy’ of (in)formality, in other words: explicitly exploring who
benefits from ambiguous governance modes in what way, should then
become part of the policies, programs, and projects that seek to help
refugees and host communities.
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